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BANKRUPTCY: CREDITOR ALLOWED TO SET OFF DEBT
AFTER DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY
FRoM the perspective of an insolvent debtor, the substance of the
federal Bankruptcy Act1 lies in the decree of discharge 2 which re-
lieves him of liability for certain of his overburdening debts.3 Al-
though the usual effect of such a discharge is to defeat any sub-
sequent action on the discharged debt,4 the Kentucky Court of
Appeals in Kaufman's of Kentucky v. Wall5 has limited its effect by
allowing a creditor to set off a discharged claim against tort judg-
ment later obtained by the bankrupt against the creditor.6
The plaintiff in Wall sustained personal injuries while shopping
in defendant's store. The defendant refused to settle this claim,
and within two months the plaintiff accrued charges of 1157 dollars
for purchases on her account at the store. Subsequently the plaintiff
initiated the instant tort action and then filed and was discharged
upon a voluntary petition in bankruptcy which included among
I Bankruptcy Act (Chandler Act) §§ 1-703, 52 Stat. 840 (1938), as amended, 11
U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1964).
2 Bankruptcy Act § 17, 52 Stat. 851 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 32 (1964).
3 See generally 1 COLLMR, BANKRUPTCY 17.27 (14th ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as
COLLIER]; 8 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY §§ 3220, 3225-35, 3237, 3239, 3307 (6th ed. 1955)
[hereinafter cited as REMINGTON]; Hartman, The Dischargeability of Debts in Bank-
ruptcy, 15 VAND. L. RIv. 13 (1961); Rifkind, Discharge of Debts in Bankruptcy and
Some Problems Related Thereto, 7 N.Y.L.F. 354 (1961).
' See note 14 infra and accompanying text.
r 383 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964).
0 With certain qualifications the right of a creditor to set off mutual debts and credits
between the estate of the bankrupt and himself in the bankruptcy proceeding is spe-
cifically provided in the act. Bankruptcy Act § 68, 52 Stat. 878 (1938), as amended,
11 U.S.C. §108 (1964). See generally 4 COLLxER 68.01-.22. Although the Wall
opinion makes no attempt to rationalize the set-off under § 68, the court cited without
comment New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau v. Bruno-New York, Inc., 120
F. Supp. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). The latter case concerned a set-off within the bank-
ruptcy proceedings against the trustee, and adopted the better view that there is
requisite "mutuality" for set-off under § 68 although one ciaim is in tort and the
other in contract.
If specific provision for set-off were not made under § 68, it could be argued that
set-off, by permitting a greater pro rata recovery, would be an improper preference of
creditors as prohibited by § 60 of the Act. Bankruptcy Act § 60, 52 Stat. 869 (1938),
as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1964). While the creditor by using a set-off in the instant
case increases his pro rata recovery on the debt, this in no way affects the amounts
which other creditors have already received out of the bankruptcy estate. Thus, such
set-off does not reflect a similar character of preference.
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her scheduled liabilities the debt for goods purchased. A 2000
dollar judgment was awarded in the tort suit against the storeowner,
and the trial court rejected the defendant's contention that the
unpaid balance of the discharged debt should be set off against the
tort judgment. Although recognizing that the discharge would bar
a direct action by the defendant to recover on the debt, the court of
appeals reversed on the ground that a set-off was necessary to prevent
the bankrupt from obtaining a greater recovery than she would
have had without the benefit of a bankruptcy proceeding.8
7 The opinion states that when the plaintiff filed the petition in bankruptcy, "she
listed her cause of action against appellant [the store] as an asset of her estate and
the indebtedness she owed appellant as a liability. She was permitted to, and did,
prosecute this cause of action in her own name following her discharge in bank-
ruptcy .... " 383 S.W.2d at 908. Since the plaintiff was allowed to prosecute person-
ally this tort action after the bankruptcy proceeding, it could not have been included
among the assets of her estate in bankruptcy. The dictates of § 70(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act require a trustee to pursue any cause of action forming a part of the
bankrupt estate. The amount of any judgment obtained is to be a part of the estate,
available for meeting debts of the bankrupt. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), 52 Stat. 879
(1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110 (a) (1958). If such a judgment had been obtained
in the instant case, the defendant could have set off the mutual debts within the
bankruptcy proceeding under § 68. See note 6 supra.
The reason for exclusion of the claim from the bankrupt's estate is not articu-
lated in the Wall opinion, but can perhaps be inferred from the Bankruptcy Act.
Section 70 (a) provides that title to property of the bankrupt vests by operation of
law in the trustee. However, in respect to rights of action § 70 (a) (5) provides that
the trustee shall have title according to the following standard: "... property, in-
cluding rights of action, which prior to the filing of the petition he [the bankrupt]
could by any means have transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold
under judicial process against him, or otherwise seized, impounded, or sequestered:
Provided, that rights of action ex delicto for libel, slander, injuries to the person of
the bankrupt or a relative, whether or not resulting in death, seduction, and criminal
conversation shall not vest in the trustee unless by the law of the State such rights
of action are subject to attachment, execution, garnishment, sequestration, or other
judicial process...." The plaintiff's brief on appeal refers to the listing of the claim
but notes that it was excluded from the estate because of its nature as a personal
injury action. Brief for Appellee, p. 2. Exclusion of the claim reflects a determina-
tion, not apparent in the Wall opinion, that it would not under Kentucky law be
subject to garnishment or other judicial process. Tort claims, particularly those for
personal injury, have been generally held to be outside the purview of the attachment
and garnishment statutes of the various states, and therefore not subject to such
process except upon final judgment or settlement. 6 Am. JuR. 2d Attachment and
Garnishment §§ 133-36 (1963); Annot. 93 A.L.R. 1088 (1934). While Kentucky does
not expressly exempt such claims in its statute, Ky. REv. STAT. ch. 425, §§ 425.190,
.215-520; 427.010-.030 (1960), it is probable that it would follow the general rule,
as have other states, without specific provision. Thus, exclusion of the claim from
the bankruptcy estate appears correct. Regardless of the legal propriety, this cause
of action was excluded and is, in effect, similar to one which might arise subsequent
to a discharge in bankruptcy.
8 383 S.W.2d at 909. The court adopted this reasoning from a case involving set-off
by a decedent's estate against a bankrupt distributee. Leach v. Armstrong, 236 Mo.
App. 382, 156 S.W.2d 959 (1941).
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The original purpose of bankruptcy laws was to salvage a portion
of the debtor's estate for ratable distribution to his creditors.9
Today, the debtor's financial rehabilitation has attained a position
of comparable importance, and discharge is considered a matter of
right in the absence of proven objections. 10 Underlying this policy
is the thesis that the public interest is served by reinstating an in-
solvent person to a position of incentive and a productive role in
society even after financial disaster.
Although the bankruptcy court determines the right to a dis-
charge, the non-bankruptcy forum in which the creditor later seeks
to collect the debt determines whether under the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act" and applicable state law12 the effect of the dis-
charge is to prevent recovery.' 3  When recovery is denied, the rule
See 1 COLLIER 14.01, at 1257-58; 7 REMINGTON § 2993, at 42.
10 See, e.g., Shelby v. Texas Improvement Loan Co., 280 F.2d 349, 355 (5th Cir.
1960); Dixon v. Lowe, 177 F.2d 807, 808 (10th Cir. 1949); 1 COLLIER 14.02, at 1259;
7 REMINGTON §§ 2992-94, at 41-45. A clear right to a discharge was first provided by
the federal bankruptcy law in the Bankruptcy Act of 1841, 5 Stat. 440 (1846).
In § 14 (c) the Bankruptcy Act specifies certain grounds for objection to the grant-
ing of a discharge. 52 Stat. 850 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §32(c) (1964). See
generally 1 COLLIER 14.07-.61; 7 REMINGTON §§ 3028-3173. The courts, however, have
construed these provisions in favor of the bankrupt by requiring the grounds asserted
to be dearly within the language of the statute. See, e.g., Gross v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.,
302 F.2d 338, 340 (8th Cir. 1962); "[S]tatutory provisions regulating discharges are reme-
dial in nature; they should be construed liberally with the purpose of carrying into effect
the legislative intent, and the statutory grounds for opposing a discharge should not
be extended by construction." Ibid. Jones v. Gertz, 121 F-2d 782 (10th Cir. 1941).
Section 15 provides that a discharge obtained through fraud may be revoked upon
application of a party in interest within one year. Bankruptcy Act § 15, 52 Stat. 851
(1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 33 (1964); see generally 1 COLLIER 15.01-.16; 7
REMINGTON §§ 3382-92.
1 Unless the debt is non-dischargeable under § 17 (a) it is released by the discharge
if it is provable in bankruptcy by § 63. Bankruptcy Act § 63, 52 Stat. 873 (1938), as
amended, 11 U.S.C. § 103 (1964).
12 Unless the Bankruptcy Act otherwise provides, the decisions have established that
the validity of a claim is to be determined in accordance with principles of local
law. Fidelity Union Casualty Co. v. Hanson, 44 S.W.2d 985, 987 (Tex. Comm'n of
App.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 599 (1932); see, e.g., Humphrey v. Tatman, 198 U.S. 91
(1905).
15 See Barbachano v. Allen, 192 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1951); In re Lowe, 36 F. Supp.
772 (W.D. Ky. 1941); 1 CoLLIER 14.62 & 17.28; see generally Smedley, Determination
of the Effect of a Discharge in Bankruptcy, 15 VAND. L. REv. 49 (1961). The follow-
ing quotations are helpful in understanding the effect of a discharge on a debt:
"[Tihe discharge is not designed to prevent creditors from attempting to collect. If
it is applicable to the case it can prevent the collection but not the attempt. If the
creditor feels that the debt is not discharged the proper procedure is for him to file
suit in the state court." COWANs, BANKRUPTCY § 184, at 102 (1963).
"Such defence is one that the state or any other court is bound to consider, and if
error is committed in failing to accord to the discharge its due weight, the way is
open to the Supreme Court of the United States." In re Biscoe, 45 F. Supp. 422,
423 (D. Mass. 1942).
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in most jurisdictions is that discharge of a debt in bankruptcy is a
valid defense to any legal proceeding to enforce payment' 4-an effect
parallel to that of the statutes of limitations and frauds.'" Section
17 (a) excludes certain debts from discharge,"6 including taxes, wages
due employees, fiduciary debts, debts not duly scheduled and liabili-
ties for certain specified acts such as obtaining property by false
representations. These debts will not be affected by the bankruptcy
proceedings even though no objection is raised by the claimant at
the time.17
The effect of the Wall decision was to allow a set-off without
reference to those limitations in the Bankruptcy Act which provide
for defeating a discharge or its effects. In the absence of precedent
permitting a set-off by a creditor directly against the discharged
bankrupt after the bankruptcy proceeding, the court was constrained
to rely upon cases involving analogous situations. Reliance was
placed on two cases which followed the settled rule allowing set-off
of discharged debts owed by distributees of a decedent's estate.'"
While these cases and Wall involve mutual obligations, there is
a distinction between permitting a set-off against a bankrupt dis-
tributee who seeks to enforce a gratuity and allowing set-off against
a bankrupt as in Wall, who claims under a judgment at law.19
The presence of other distributees whose interests must be protected
is a circumstance which supports the allowance of a set-off and is not
found in the instant case, where set-off is sought after the bankruptcy
1" See 1 COLLMR 1 17.27; 8 REMINGTON § 3226. See, e.g., Helms v. Holmes, 129 F.2d
263, 266 (4th Cir. 1942), 28 VA. L. REv. 1129; Flowers v. Gray, 170 Kan. 266, 269, 225
P.2d 94, 97 (1950); Crandall v. Durham, 348 Mo. 240, 242, 152 S.W.2d 1044, 1045
(1941) (past obligations sufficient consideration for new promise to pay discharged
debt); First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Parker, 232 N.C. 512, 514-15, 61 S.E.2d 441,
443 (1950). However, a minority of cases hold that the discharge not only bars the
remedy but also extinguishes the debt. See, e.g., Colton v. Depew, 59 NJ. Eq. 126,
128, 44 At. 662, 663 (Ch. 1899); Nossek v. A. H. Todd & Son, 160 Misc. 528, 530, 290
N.Y. Supp. 253, 255 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Hobough v. Murphy, 114 Pa. 358, 359, 7 Ad. 139
(1886).
2rSee COwANS, op. cit. supra note 13, § 184.
16 Bankruptcy Act § 17(a), 52 Stat. 851 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)
(1964).
1 TSee Friend v. Talcott, 228 U.S. 27, 39-41 (1913), where the creditor did, however,
oppose composition with other creditors; Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Meyers, 33 Misc. 2d 69,
70, 223 N.Y.S.2d 923, 924 (Jefferson County Ct. 1962).
18 In re Morgan's Estate, 226 Iowa 68, 283 N.W. 267 (1939) (legatee), 5 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 214; Leach v. Armstrong, 236 Mo. App. 382, 156 S.W.2d 959 (1941) (heir), 90 U.
PA. L. R y. 742 (1942). Accord, Johnson v. Jones, 54 Ga. App. 456, 188 SE. 279
(1936) (legatee became bankrupt after testator's death).
19 See 5 U. Pirr. L. REv. 214, 216 (1939). However, while a distributee of a de-
cedent's estate receives his share gratuitously, he nonetheless takes it by legal right.
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distribution. The debt incurred by the distributee is in the nature
of a prepayment of his bequest or inheritance, so that he is unjustly
enriched if he benefits by the amount of the uncollectible debt and
still gets his full share of the estate. Without set-off of the debt,
assets of the estate available for distributees would be reduced ac-
cordingly.20 Having already shared pro rata in the assets at bank-
ruptcy, the other creditors in Wall are not in the position of the
distributees of a decedent's estate; rather, they are unaffected by the
set-off. Moreover, the court's reliance upon the distributee cases
is questionable because Kentucky does not recognize a similar right
to set off debts of the distributee which have been barred by the
statute of limitations.21 A right to set off such unenforceable debts
has been frequently relied upon by other courts as a basis for parallel
treatment of the bar of a bankruptcy discharge.22
The court also analogized the instant case to decisions which
have subjected assignees of a bankrupt's claim to a set-off of a debt
owed by the bankrupt prior to discharge where the mutual obliga-
tions arose out of the same transaction.23 The policy articulated in
those cases is that a debtor should not be permitted to frustrate a
creditor's set-off in bankruptcy merely by assigning his claim to a
third party.24 Arguably, since the assignee took the claim subject to
20 One court viewed the issue not as a question of the enforcement of an obliga-
tion, but of "equality of purchase by inheritance among the heirs." Leach v. Arm-
strong, 236 Mo. App. 382, 388, 156 S.W.2d 959, 962 (1941). This situation demon-
strates some of the same justifications for set-off found in the treatment of intestacy
advancements and testacy ademption. See generally LEACH, Tm LAw oF WILLS 9-15,
148-51 (2d ed. 1960).
21 Luscher v. Security Trust Co., 178 Ky. 593, 199 S.W. 613 (1918).
22 E.g., Wood v. Knotts, 196 Iowa 544, 194 N.W. 953, 956 (1923) (cited by In re
Morgan's Estate, 226 Iowa 68, 283 N.W. 267 (1939), supra note 18); In re Lindmeyer's
Estate, 182 Minn. 607, 235 N.W. 377 (1931); In re Leitman's Estate, 149 Mo. 112, 121,
50 S.W. 307, 310 (1899) (cited by Leach v. Armstrong, 236 Mo. App. 382, 156 S.W.2d
959 (1941), supra note 18); 5 U. Prrr. L. REv. 214, 215 (1939). Contra, e.g., Kimball
v. Scribner, 174 App. Div. 845, 161 N.Y. Supp. 511 (1916); In re Light's Estate, 136 Pa.
211, 20 Atl. 536 (1890). Since policy factors favor set-off against distributees to a
greater extent than against other debtors and since the evidentiary policy considera-
tions underlying the statute of limitations would seem to weigh less in this context
than the purposes of bankruptcy adjudication, a fortiori it is patently inconsistent
to uphold the bar of the statute to benefit the distributee but refuse to honor
bankruptcy discharge to the detriment of the bankrupt in Wall. It would also
follow that a set-off should dearly be denied in a jurisdiction which views the dis-
charge as an extinguishment of the debt itself.
22 Gill v. Richmond Co-op. Ass'n, 309 Mass. 73, 82, 34 N.E.2d 509, 515 (1941);
accord, Turner v. Dickey, 3 F. Supp. 360, 361 (W.D. Tenn. 1932).
24 If the law were otherwise, the creditor would be limited to a ratable share of
the value received by the bankrupt from the assignment, which might be nothing, and
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any infirmities and was not a party to the bankruptcy proceeding,
he is in no position to merit its protection.25 Thus, standing alone,
these cases would not seem to provide adequate support for the result
in Wall.
Considering the purposes of the bankruptcy laws, the rationale
adopted in Wall subverts to a considerable extent the effect a dis-
charge is manifestly intended to have under the act.20 Although
discharge is not granted for the negative purpose of preventing a
creditor's recovery on rightful claims, this is a necessary incident
of any meaningful protection for the bankrupt.27
In Wall, set-off after discharge was allowed against a tort claim
which had arisen before bankruptcy and had not been included
among the final list of assets in the bankruptcy estate. 28 The bank-
rupt was allowed to prosecute the claim after her discharge. Because
the cause of action was not a factor in the bankruptcy proceedings,
its accrual prior to filing could have no effect on the disposition of
the estate. Thus, since the time of accrual is not pivotal, a court
later be required to pay the entire claim which he could have set off in the bankruptcy
proceeding.
2 Cases have frequently asserted that the right to plead a discharge is personal
to the bankrupt; however, such authorities usually rely upon § 16 of the Bankruptcy
Act, 52 Stat. 550 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 34 (1964), which provides that
liability of a co-debtor, guarantor, or surety is not altered by a discharge. E.g.,
Flowers v. Gray, 170 Kan. 266, 269, 225 P.2d 94, 97 (1950) (surety) (dictum); England
Motor Co. v. Greenville Commercial Body Co., 163 Miss. 22, 27, 138 So. 591, 592
(1932) (garnishee of creditor of bankrupt); Alabama Great So. Ry. v. Crawley, 118
Miss. 272, 278-79, 79 So. 94-95 (1918) (garnishee); Fidelity Union Cas. Co. v. Hanson,
44 S.W.2d 985, 988 (Tex. Comm'n App.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 599 (1932) (insurer);
State ex Rel. Bumgarner v. Sims, 139 W. Va. 92, 119, 79 S.E.2d 277, 293 (1953) (sec-
ondarily liable party). Still, a successor in interest has been allowed to set up the
defense of discharge. Fleitas v. Richardson, 147 U.S. 550, 556 (1893) (mortgagee
taking after discharge raising discharge against wife of bankrupt, who was mortgagee
prior to discharge).
28 Commenting on the allowance of a set-off in Gill v. Richmond Co-op. Ass'n, 309
Mass. 73, 34 N.E.2d 509 (1941), Collier noted that "this case seems to be in error, for
the use of the debt as a set-off is merely another means of enforcing payment. More-
over, it would seem that the requisite mutuality of obligation has been destroyed."
1 CoLL . 17.27, at 1695 n.7. For a case denying a right of set-off, see Robinson v.
Smith, 130 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
The right of banks to set off deposits against claims of the bankrupt clearly applies
only to the balance existing when the petition is filed and not to subsequent deposits.
4 CoLLMu 68.16[3].
27 However, the bankrupt may at his election waive the bar of a discharge and
renew the discharged obligation by making a new promise to honor the debt, with
no additional consideration other than the moral obligation to pay the unextinguished
debt. See, e.g., Crandall v. Durham, 348 Mo. 240, 242, 152 S.W.2d 1044, 1045 (1941);
1 CoLLr 17.33-.37; 7 REMINGTON §§ 3288-95, 3297-98.
28 See note 7 supra.
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applying the Wall rationale could reasonably go beyond its factual
setting to allow set-off against a claim arising subsequent to bank-
ruptcy.
To hold the bankrupt to the discharged obligation by way of
set-off whenever he later carries on business transactions and seeks
to collect subsequently matured claims of his own renders the
discharge a somewhat meaningless determination. The bankrupt
is thus encumbered by the necessity of carefully avoiding dealings
with anyone to whom he owed a debt at the time of his prior
financial failures. This rule invites future litigation; a creditor of
the bankrupt will be encouraged to resist later claims so that he may
reduce their amount by previously discharged debts-a result he
could not be assured of accomplishing otherwise than by causing the
bankrupt to go into court to enforce his own claims.29
The facts of the Wall case, however, indicate certain equitable
considerations which, though unarticulated, may lend some support
to the holding.30 While the creditor's brief refers to the question-
able nature and purpose of incurring the debt for purchases on
credit,3 ' the opinion reflects no reliance upon bad faith of the
shopper. If, indeed, it could have been found that the debt was'
incurred by the bankrupt upon credit with no intention at the time
to pay for the goods so purchased (as a sort of out-of-court exaction
of retribution for the injury), the debt would have been properly
non-dischargeable under section 17 (a) (2) as constituting the obtain-
ing of property by false representation. 32  The assertions of the
11 While the Bankruptcy Act does not prevent the attempt to collect a discharged
debt in court, see note 13 supra, it is not meant to encourage litigation. One writer
has suggested that the bankrupt should be protected from future creditor harass-
ment by legislation to give the bankruptcy court clear jurisdiction for final determina-
tion of the effect of the discharge upon all debts. Rifkind, supra note 3, at 869.
30A set-off did not occur within the bankruptcy proceeding under § 68 because
the personal injury claim did not pass to the trustee in bankruptcy under § 70 (a) for
prosecution to judgment. See note 7 supra; Bankruptcy Act § 70 (a), 52 Stat. 879
(1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1964). It is arguable that this nature of the
claim alone should not defeat the creditor's right to set off before discharge and thus
that it should be permitted when the judgment is later determined.
"I "Within a period of some 30 to 60 days following the accident she incurred an
indebtedness to the defendant in the amount of $1157.01, freely admitting that this
was done because no effort was made to settle her claim." Brief for Appellant, p. 3.
The following question and response on deposition is particularly interesting:
"128. Yes, as a matter of fact, it is right unusual for you to buy nine pairs of shoes
in less than a month, isn't it? A. Well, I guess so." Ibid.
2 The better rule would seem to be that a purchase of goods on credit by one who
falsely represents a present intention to pay for them creates a liability for property
obtained by false representations which is not discharged in bankruptcy. Several juris-
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store and statements by the bankrupt in deposition regarding her
purpose might well have led to this conclusion.33 However, the
opinion does not discuss this possibility, which would have allowed
a set-off and yet remained within the letter of the bankruptcy law.
While the court could thus have denied protection if it found
the debt to be one which should not be escaped by an unworthy
debtor,3 4 the rationale employed frustrates a major bankruptcy
purpose by facilitating a method of defeating a discharge. A set-
off should be allowed only within the bankruptcy proceedings and
prior to discharge. Unless the debt is non-dischargeable, the courts
should not negate the effect of a discharge by a method which cannot
be persuasively distinguished from permitting affirmative enforce-
ment by the creditor.35 If there is a need of greater protection for
creditors against undeserved procurement of debt discharge, it
should be met by additional and appropriate safeguards enacted by
Congress and not by skirting the existing law to create an avenue
for the creditor to overcome protection of well-intentioned and
opportunistic debtors alike.
dictions-including Kentucky-have so held. E.g., Crawford v. Davison-Paxon Co., 46
Ga. App. 161, 166 S.E. 872 (1932), 17 MINN. L. REv. 658 (1933); Louisville Dry Goods
Co. v. Lanman, 135 Ky. 163, 169, 121 S.W. 1042, 1043-44 (1909); Boerer v. Cicero Smith
Lumber Co., 292 S.W. 632, 635-36 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); see Ames v. Moir, 138 U.S.
306 (1891), where a purchaser, knowing himself to be insolvent, took goods with the in-
tention of disposing of them without paying the price. He was not released from
liability by a discharge in bankruptcy, which would seem to be a rather clear sug-
gestion by the Supreme Court of a potential rationale for Wall. See also Forsyth v.
Vehmeyer, 177 U.S. 177 (1900); Wells v. Blitch, 182 Ga. 826, 831-32, 187 S.E. 86, 90
(1936); Morris Fin. & Loan, Inc. v. Dickerson, 57 So. 2d 786 (La. 1952); Wheeler &
Motter Merc. Co. v. Green, 97 Okla. 96, 222 Pac. 965 (1924); Rowell v. Ricker, 79 Vt.
552, 66 At. 569 (1907); Zerega Distrib. Co. v. Gough, 52 Wash. 2d 443, 325 P.2d 894
(1958). See generally 1 COLLIER 17.16[3]. But see Davison-Paxon v. Caldwell, 115
F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1940). (Sibley, J., dissenting), cert. denied,, 313 U.S. 564 (1941).
Of course, mere failure to pay is not sufficient to establish that the debt is of this
nature. See Brooks v. Pitts, 24 Ga. App. 386, 100 S.E. 776 (1919); De Latour v. Lala,
15 La. App. 276, 131 So. 211 (1930). Although under the criminal law of the majority
of jurisdictions, a misrepresentation of intention is insufficient for this offense, the
requirements should not be so stringtent under the remedial bankruptcy law as under
the penal law. In addition, the American Law Institute now adopts the minority view
that it is sufficient for the criminal offense. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3 (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962). See MODEL PENAL CODE 206.2, comment 7 (Tent. Draft. No. 2,
1954).
'$See note 31, supra.
3" The Act should be construed to "prevent the discharge in bankruptcy of a
liability which would not exist but for the fraudulent conduct of the Bankrupt." Hart-
ford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. Flanagan, 28 F. Supp. 415, 419 (S.D. Ohio 1939).
"Allowance of a set-off after discharge appears inconsistent with the policy of
carrying out remedial legislative intent by construction in favor of the bankrupt, as
discussed in note 10 supra.
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